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A FAMOUS TITLE IS WORTH 1,000 PUBLICITY STUNTS:
DOES THE OWNER OF THE MOTION PICTURE
COPYRIGHT TO THE AMITYVILLE HORROR
OWN THE TITLE?
The general rule of law is that the noblest of human produc-
tions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the
air to common use.
-Justice Brandeis
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Warning: Some Rights in Titles Are Not Assignable
Rules protecting titles in the entertainment industry may confuse,
agitate and even exasperate the experienced lawyer who would like to
answer the simple question: Does the owner of a copyrighted work own
its title? Somewhere between the fringe areas of trademark law and the
shadow of copyright, courts give effect to contract clauses that transfer
titles in agreements between sellers and buyers of literary works. Even
though title rights are founded upon, and parallel, some principles of
trademark's unfair competition, California has unique prerequisites for
protection of titles.
Usually, anyone may use an existing title.' California recognizes
quasi-property rights in titles only in claims of unfair competition for
"palming off" one's literary work as the work of another.' In Lutz v. de
Laurentiis, ("Lutz") 4 the California Court of Appeal remanded, for trial,
1. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued against an extension of unfair competition principles; he
expressed the view that intellectual property rights should only be enforced in special circum-
stances which serve the public welfare. Id.
2. Lutz v. de Laurentiis, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1989).
The California Court of Appeal held:
[a]nyone may use a title if there is no secondary significance. Unfair competition
consists in palming off one's goods as those of another. The mere use of a substan-
tially similar title, if not used in such a manner as to induce the public to believe that
the work to which it is applied is the identical thing which it originally designated,
does not constitute unfair competition.
Id. (quoting Curtis v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 469, 295 P.2d 62
(1956)).
3. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
4. Id. The parties to the case are George Lutz, Kathleen Lutz, John G. Jones, Paul
Kimatian and Gotham Press Publishing, Inc. as plaintiffs and defendants Dino de Laurentiis,
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the Lutzes' claim that Orion Pictures ("Orion") had "palmed off" Ami-
tyville II: The Possession as the Lutzes' sequel to The Amityville Horror. ,
The Lutzes claim that Orion titled their movie similarly in order to
deceive the public into believing that the Orion movie was the film ver-
sion of the Lutzes' sequel book, "The Amityville Horror II. ''6 Thus,
Orion benefited because movie goers bought tickets thinking that they
were viewing the film version of the Lutzes' sequel.7
Orion claims "Foul!" because the Lutzes sold, in gross,8 their motion
picture rights in the title to Orion's predecessor-in-interest, who pro-
duced the motion picture version of the Lutzes' original book.9 But, title
transfer agreements, such as the clause in the Lutzes' contract of sale for
the movie copyright to "The Amityville Horror," may seek to convey
rights in titles that are personal to the author and incapable of transfer. 10
Other creators of underlying works, like the Lutzes, have successfully
disputed the extent of title rights capable of transfer to motion picture
producers." Resolution of Lutz is therefore complicated by the unique
nature of title rights in California.'2
B. A Second Look at the Holdings of Tomlin v.
Walt Disney Productions
The majority in Lutz discussed property rights in titles in a forth-
Dino de Laurentiis Corp., Productions, Ltd., Orion Pictures Corp, Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries, Inc. and EMI, Inc. Id. at 1321-22 n.2, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108 n.2.
5. Id. at 1322, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. "In gross" is defined: "In a large quantity or sum; without deduction, division, or
particulars; by wholesale. At large, in one sum; not annexed to or dependent upon another
thing. Common in gross is such as is neither appendant nor appurtenant to land [property],
but is annexed to a man's person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (5th ed. 1983).
9. See Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1326, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
10. Contra Id. at 1326, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Roth, P.J., dissenting) ("It is astonishing
that the Lutzes should sell exclusive and perpetual motion picture and television rights to the
first book, including the title "The Amityville Horror," to a picture company, then claim that
any property rights in a resulting secondary meaning of that title still belong to them exclu-
sively."). It's possible that Justice Roth felt that the transfer contract contained the Lutzes'
implied waiver of their right to sue Orion. But cf. Trust Company Bank v. MGM/UA En-
tertainment Co., 772 F.2d 740, 746 (1985) citing the district court's reliance upon Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (1954) (the Sam Spade deci-
sion) (A producer can "not necessarily rely on an implicit grant of sequel rights in an agree-
ment conveying motion picture rights.").
11. See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text on Jacqueline Susann's suit for Twenti-
eth Century-Fox's use of the title Beyond the Valley of the Dolls.
12. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.2, at 33 (3d ed. 1986) ("The pat-
tern by which property rights emerge and grow in a society is related to increases in the ratio
of the benefits of property rights to their costs.").
[Vol. 10
TITLE PROTECTION
right manner by (1) clarifying the pleading required to establish an action
of unfair competition; (2) defining the elements and limits of property
rights in titles; and (3) reviewing the holdings and misconceptions of
Tomlin v. Walt Disney Productions ("Tomlin"). la On the other hand,
the dissent discussed public policy reasons for (1) limiting title rights and
(2) protecting the expectations of buyers of motion picture rights in liter-
ary works to exploit the titles.
Title rights cases are rarely published, perhaps because producers
generally avoid using a title identified with another's work.14 The Lutz
case is the first comprehensive"5 look at the holdings of Tomlin, a 1971
case which was decided in the uncertain aftermath of the U.S. Supreme
Court cases, Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Company 16 and
Compco Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting. 17 Sears and Compco were
generally seen as limiting states' ability to create intellectual property
rights.' 8
The Constitution specifically gives Congress the power to grant, for
a "limited time," property rights in artistic works. 9 The Supreme Court
holdings in Sears and Compco have been interpreted to say that since
Congress chose not to grant copyright protection to titles along with the
artistic work which they identify, states were left no room to create prop-
erty rights in titles.2" Therefore, Sears and Compco restricted the states'
ability to protect titles of literary works in unfair competition cases be-
cause the field of property rights in titles was preempted by the federal
copyright statute.2 Thus, state laws protecting titles are now under the
shadow of federal copyright law and are distinguished from trademark
13. Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971).
14. Interview with Albert Spevak, Vice-President for Business Affairs, NBC Productions,
Inc. (Sept. 1989). Producers normally have a title check run by specialists who can determine
if a similar title has been used and who keep track of titles mentioned in trade publications.
Most production budgets include insurance against losses should a problem arise over the
production's title. Id. See Robinson, Insurance Coverage of Intellectual Property Lawsuits, 13
NEW MArrER I (Summer 1988) (NEW MATrER is the official publication of the State Bar of
California Intellectual Property Section).
15. Cf Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d. 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1977) (Allied Artists is the only other title case that has been published since Tomlin, and it
decided the narrow issue of California's authority to enforce an injunction with extraterritorial
impact).
16. 376 U.S. 224 (1964) reh'g denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964) reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
18. See Bricker, Thirty Months After Sears and Compco, 14 BULLETIN OF THE COPY-
RIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., 293, 296 (1967).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
19901
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law. Because Lutz is only California's second published title case in
eighteen years, it is an important second look at Tomlin for any lawyer
seeking to answer the "simple" question: Does the owner of a copy-
righted work own its title?
C. The History of "Equity" Principles of Fairness in Title Protection
Titles are protected by judicial application of equity principles that
discourage unfair competition such as passing off one's goods for those of
another. These equity principles originated over eight hundred years ago
in the special English Courts of the Fair which gave same-day hearing to
complaints of unfair business conduct in the marketplace.22 The English
common law courts were too limited or inflexible to remedy such unjust
or unfair situations.23 In the eighteenth century, the English courts con-
solidated the common law and equity courts and adopted the Law
Merchant of the Fairs.24 Beginning with the accession of Lord Mansfield
to the Chief Justiceship of the King's Bench in 1756, the consolidated
court developed a system of discretionary rules for equitable relief, which
has been followed and developed in the United States to settle such
22. Also known as the Court Pepoudrous. Burdick, What is the Law Merchant, in 3 SE-
LECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 34 (1909). In 1891, Thomas E. Scrutton quoted old
English law books in writing that:
This Court is incident to every fair and market because that for contracts and injuries
done concerning the fair or market there shall be as speedy justice done for advance-
ment of trade and traffic as the dust can fall from the feet, the proceeding there being
de hora in horam ["of the hour in the hour"].
Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW 9 (1909).
23. Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 9 (1909).
24. Id. at 13. Cf Keeble v. Hickeringill, Queen's Bench, 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127
(1707) ("Every man that hath a property may employ it for his pleasure and profit, as for
alluring and procuring decoy ducks to come to his pond ... and he that hinders another in his
trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering him.") The opinion in Keeble was by
Chief Justice Holt whom "some enthusiastic lovers of jurisprudence regard . . . with higher
veneration than any English Judge who preceded or has followed him." 4 J. CAMPBELL, 1
LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 383 (3d ed. 1873). Dukeminier writes:
After the flight of James II to France, abandoning the throne, Holt, as a member of
the House of Commons, played a leading role in the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy under William and Mary, a system that survives today. Subsequently he
was appointed chief justice, which office he held from 1689 to 1710. He was noted
for his integrity and independence and for his common sense as well as his deep
learning in the law .... Chief Justice Holt was the first of a line of enlightened
judges who, in the eighteenth century, shaped English law to accommodate the needs
of a mercantile society that would dominate world trading.
J. DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY 23 n.4 (2d ed. 1988).
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claims.25
In the literary field, American courts recognized equity protection
for titles to assignees of rights as early as 1884.26 During the early stages
of the motion picture industry, American courts held that no one would
be deceived into purchasing a movie ticket merely because the movie had
the same title as a book because books and movies were not seen as com-
peting products. 27 As the motion picture industry matured, the courts
extended protection of titles because the film rights of popular books
were recognized to compete with similarly titled motion pictures.2' The
courts now recognize the underlying exigency to protect literary titles in
other forms of media to preserve the creative atmosphere in a complex
and interrelated entertainment industry.29
In reliance upon these equity principals for protection,3" producers
invest fortunes in advertising to establish the public recognition neces-
sary for proprietary rights in the titles of books, plays, songs, television
programs and motion pictures.3 Now, when American courts hear title
cases of unfair competition, they may use the traditional phrase that they
are "sitting in equity" in order to explain why they follow flexible rules to
remedy unjust or unfair situations.
3 2
25. Compare Wotherspoon v. Currie, E.A. 5 L.R. 508 (1872) with Lutz v. de Laurentiis,
211 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 260 Cal. Rptr. 106.
26. Angel, Legal Protection for Titles in the Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
279, 298 (Jan. 1979).
27. Cf Atlas Manufacturing Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 F. 398 (8th Cir. 1913) (Books
belong to the "field of literature" and motion pictures are in "the domain of theatricals.").
28. International Film Serv. Co. v. Associated Producers, Inc., 273 F. 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
29. Cf Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 234-35, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 123
(1971) (recognizing that a motion picture company could deceive the public into believing that
its film was based upon another's book).
30. T. MCCARTHY, 2 TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10 Literary, Artistic
and Entertainment Rights (1988).
31. As motion picture production budgets soar, producers seek to offset their costs by
selling distribution, cable, cassette and merchandizing rights long before the final edit. Broad-
casters, who also cannot accept high levels of financial risk, are looking into various means,
such as global networks, of amortizing their huge program costs. See Loughery, The Global
Network, in UCLA 13TH ANNUAL ENTERTAINMENT LAW SYMPosIuM 67 (Dec. 1988).
32. California recognizes this common law action for unfair competition in Civil Code
§ 3369 which provides in pertinent part:
2. Any person performing or proposing to perform an act of unfair competition
within this state may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.
3. As used in this section, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practice and unfair or misleading advertising ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1990).
1990]
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Amityville Horror: The First Book and Film
In 1975, plaintiffs George and Kathleen Lutz bought a house at 112
Ocean Boulevard, in a small and obscure town, Amityville, New York.33
A year earlier, a previous occupant, Ronald "Butch" Joseph DeFeo, Jr.,
had murdered his entire family in this house.34 At his trial, DeFeo
claimed that, on November 13, 1974, demons had made him kill his fa-
ther Ronald, Sr., and his mother Louise, his brothers Mark and John,
and his sisters Dawn and Allison.35
On February 5, 1976, twenty-eight days after moving in, the Lutzes
and their three children fled in fear from this home which they had come
to believe was haunted. Because public interest was aroused by the terri-
fying and unique events that drove them out of their home, the Lutzes
hired Jay Anson to write a book entitled "The Amityville Horror.,
3 6
"The Amityville Horror," which relates the psychic phenomena exper-
ienced during their twenty-eight day residence in the house, became a
national best-seller.37 Over 3,000,000 copies of the book were sold; the
hardcover version had fourteen printings between 1977 and March 1978;
and the paperback version was published in August 1978.38
On September 28, 1977, the Lutzes authorized Professional Films,
Inc. ("PFI") to produce a motion picture version of "The Amityville
Horror. ' 39 Under the agreement, the Lutzes granted PFI the right to
use the book title and their names' in connection with that motion pic-
ture version of their book.4" The Lutzes claim to have retained all other
rights to the title, the use of their name and the exclusive right to make
33. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1320, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
34. Id.
35. G. SULLIVAN & H. ARONSON, HIGH HOPES, THE AMITYVILLE MURDERS 286, 297-
300 (Coward, McCann & Geoghegan 1981).
36. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1320, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
37. Id.
38. Appellants' Reply Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 8,
Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Nov. 11, 1988).
39. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1320, 260 Cal. Rptr at 107.
40. Appellants' Reply Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 8,
Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Nov. 11, 1988). "Paragraph 12 of the Agreement granted the Purchaser
the limited right to use 'the name and likeness and biography' of the Lutzes 'in connection
with the advertising, publicizing and/or any other use or exploitation of any of the rights ...
granted Purchaser with respect to the Property.' " Id.
41. Id. at 6-7. The plaintiffs state:
Paragraph 1 of the Agreement states that '[e]xcept for the rights specifically reserved
by Owner in Article 2 [of the Agreement],' Owner conveyed the right to make mo-
tion picture version of the Property. (C.T. at 1137). Article 1 describes the following
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additional motion pictures depicting themselves in events occurring after
the events depicted in the book.42 They claim to have specifically re-
tained the exclusive rights to publish literary sequels to the book.43
The Lutzes agreed to wait five years to proceed with motion picture
sequels. This holdback granted a right of first refusal to PFI to match
any offers made to the Lutzes to make motion picture sequels during the
five years." PFI assigned its film rights and obligations to American
International Pictures ("AIP") who produced and released the major
box office smash, The Amityville Horror, based upon the Lutzes' book in
specific rights '[included' within the right to make the motion picture version of the
Property, i.e., the book entitled The Amityville Horror:
(a) The right to make and exploit a motion picture version of the book The Amity-
ville Horror;
(b) The right to exhibit and transmit the motion-picture version of the book The
Amityville Horror by, e.g., television, cable and film;
(c) The right to broadcast portions of the book 'for the purpose of advertising...
[the] motion picture' authorized under the Agreement;
(d) The right to publish excerpts, novelizations, and other versions of the book
'[flor the purpose of advertising . . . [the] motion picture' authorized under the
Agreement;
(e) The right to sell and distribute recordings of the sound track of the motion
picture version of the book;
(f) The right to use the 'characters' and 'the title of the Property' but only '[f]or
any of the purposes specified in other subdivisions of this . . . article 1 ... ;['] and
(g) The right to use and exploit 'commercial or merchandise tie-ups' in connection
with the book and the motion picture authorized under the Agreement.
Id.
42. Respondents' Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 4, Lutz
(No. B 029 439) (Aug. 15, 1988). Article 2 of the Literary Purchase Agreement reserves rights
to the Lutzes to make additional motion pictures:
"[S]equel feature rights" in the Property [the book, The Amityville Horror] reserved
by the Owner shall be deemed to mean the right to depict George and Kathleen Lutz
[the Lutzes] and their children or any of them, in events occurring after the period of
time depicted in the Property in one or more feature length motion pictures. In the
exercise of any ... sequel feature rights, Owner shall not depict any of the events
depicted in the Property [i.e., strange events occurring in the Amityville house].
Agreement, Paragraph 2(c).
Id.
43. Appellants' Reply Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 8,
Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Nov. 11, 1988). "Article 2, describing the rights that the Lutzes re-
served, commences by reciting that the Owner reserves all 'publication rights in and to the
Property,' except for the 'limited publication rights ... granted to Purchaser.' " Id.
44. Respondents' Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 5, Lutz
(No. B 029 439) (Aug. 15, 1988).
The owner will not exercise or use any ... sequel feature rights prior to the expira-
tion of five (5) years after the date of first public showing in the United States of the
first motion picture based upon the Property or seven (7) years from the date of this
Agreement, whichever shall first occur .... If the Owner shall at anytime hereafter
desire to grant (and the term "grant" shall include all forms and types of transfers
and grants of rights or of authority) any of said reserved ... sequel feature rights in
the Property, Owner shall not do so until he shall have first afforded Purchaser an
opportunity to acquire the rights which Owner shall desire to grant ....
Id. citing the Agreement.
1990]
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1979.'" Defendant Orion Pictures succeeded to AIP's rights and obliga-
tions.46 The public paid over $75,000,000 in box office receipts to view
this popular film.4
The Lutzes went on an extensive publicity campaign which included
interviews in newspapers, on approximately fifty radio stations and on
the Merv Griffin television show.4" While they traveled world-wide to
discuss their experiences and to promote the book and film versions of
The Amityville Horror, they also spoke about subsequent unique events
and happenings which would be the subject of sequel books and mov-
ies.49 People Magazine published a feature article about the Lutzes. °
B. The Lutzes' Book Sequel: "The Amityville Horror II"
The Lutzes granted exclusive rights to write and publish a book se-
quel to "The Amityville Horror" to plaintiffs John G. Jones and Paul
Kimatian.5" The Lutzes also granted the writers the option to produce
motion picture sequels to the film, The Amityville Horror, subject to the
five-year holdback right of first refusal granted to PFI.52 Jones and Ki-
matian partially assigned their rights to plaintiff Gotham Press Publish-
ing, Inc.53
In 1981 Jones and Kimatian published "The Amityville Horror
II." 4 It was published under the titles "The Amityville Horror, Part II"
in Great Britain and "Amityville II" in France." In mid-1982 the plain-
tiffs prepared a synopsis, versions of a screenplay and a budget for the
motion picture version of "The Amityville Horror II. ' 'S6 At the time, the
book sequel was already a best seller and had generated substantial inter-
est among potential backers of a motion picture version to be entitled
The Amityville Horror 11. 51
45. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Appellants' Answer to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeal at 7,
Lutz (No. B 029 439) (July 24, 1989).
49. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
50. Appellants' Answer to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeal at 7,
Lutz (No. B 029 439) (July 24, 1989).
51. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Appellants' Opening Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at
10-11, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (June 9, 1988).
56. Id.
57. Id. See also Appellants' Answer to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing in the Court of
Appeal at 7, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (July 24, 1989). In naming their book, the Lutzes followed
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C. Orion Releases the Dino de Laurentiis Films Entitled
Amityville II: The Possession and Amityville 3-D
Dino de Laurentiis produced a motion picture about a fictional fam-
ily named Montelli who live in the Amityville house prior to its purchase
by the Lutzes.58 Orion claims the film is based upon Hans Holzer's 1979
paperback book, "Murder in Amityville," which dealt with DeFeo's un-
successful criminal defense of possession by demons.59 Holzer's book
discussed the trial and consisted almost exclusively of verbatim quotes
from the trial transcript, an interview with a trace medium and discus-
sions of the trial court's rulings on the insanity defense.'o Prior to re-
lease, Orion changed the movie's title from Murder in Amityville to
Amityville II: The Possession. 6
In September, 1982 Orion began advertising and distributing Amity-
ville II: The Possession in the United States and under the title Amityville
II in foreign markets.6 2 The television, radio and print advertising made
use of the Lutzes' name and the title The Amityville Horror. 63 In 1983
Orion released another motion picture about unrelated fictional events
again set in the Amityville home at 112 Ocean Boulevard." The film
was entitled Amityville 3-D and used special effects to give viewers a
vivid, three-dimensional perception of the action.65
the regular custom and practice in the motion picture industry of making sequel designations
by Roman numerals II and III, et seq., or the Arabic numerals 2 or 3, et seq. The movie-going
public would be familiar with the following examples: The Omen was followed by Damien:
Omen 1 and The Exorcist, by Exorcist II. The Heretic. There were Jaws, Jaws 11 and Jaws 3-
D. Cf Id. at 8.
58. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
59. Appellant's Reply Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at
14-15, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Nov. 8, 1988). Orion refused to credit Holzer and he obtained
film credit only as the result of a New York State civil suit. Id. See also Lutz, 211 Cal. App.
3d at 1321 n.l, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107 n.1.
60. Appellant's Reply Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at
14-15, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Nov. 8, 1988).
61. Id.
62. Appellant's Opening Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at
11, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (June 9, 1988).
63. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08. The advertising said, "The
Night of February 5, 1976, George and Kathleen Lutz and their three children fled their home
in Amityville, New York. They got out alive! Their living nightmare shocked audiences
around the world in 'The Amityville Horror.'" Id.
64. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108. See also Appellant's Opening
Brief, Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County at 13, Lutz (No. B 029 439)
(June 9, 1988).
65. Id.
1990]
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D. Procedural History and Holding of Lutz
On September 21, 1982, the Lutzes sought to enjoin Orion's use of
the title Amityville II: The Possession for de Laurentiis' recently released
motion picture.66 The complaint was amended four times over the next
three years; each time Orion demurred and on December 10, 1985, the
demurrers were sustained without leave to amend most of the thirteen
counts.
67
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted defendants' mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings on the remaining counts on June 19,
1987.68 On June 29, 1989, the California Court of Appeal affirmed in
part and reversed in part the trial court's order dismissing the com-
plaint.69 Writing for the majority, Justice Compton declared that all of
the counts of the complaint 70 would be merged into the one count for
unfair competition, which could not, as a matter of law, be dismissed on
demurrer because "the status of secondary meaning can only be deter-
mined after an inquiry into the facts ... [not] at the demurrer stage of the
66. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321-22, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
The complaint revolved around the theme that the motion picture unfairly competed
with John Jones' best selling book, The Amityville Horror II. They sought a Tempo-
rary Restraining Order ("TRO") to enjoin defendants' distribution of Amityville I:
The Possession. Four hours later, the court issued a TRO requiring Orion to change
the title as well as to recall and change all advertising for the picture. [Tierney Decl.,
September 21, 1982, PP4 (C.T. 156)]. Upon application for reconsideration by
Orion, the Superior Court, on the next day, stayed the TRO. [Order Modifying
TRO, September 22, 1982 (C.T. 167)]. The further modified TRO subsequently re-
quired Orion to undertake a plan of corrective advertising but the plaintiffs did not
post the bond required for the modified Order; therefore, all TROs were without
effect. [Goldberg Decl., October 21, 1982, PP5 (C.T. 280)]. The defendants volunta-
rily took action to eliminate references to the Lutz family in advertising and to af-
firmatively add disclaimers in an effort to moot the injunctive relief sought by
plaintiffs. [Goldberg Decl., October 21, 1982, PP5 (C.T. 280)].
Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 21-22, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Aug. 8,
1989).
67. Id. (citing Minute Order, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (Dec. 10, 1985)). Plaintiffs petitioned
on appeal for a Writ of Mandamus and/or certiorari to reverse the Superior Court's order.
Denied by the Court of Appeal, they then unsuccessfully petitioned for review before the
Supreme Court of the State of California. Id.
68. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1320, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
69. Id. at 1324-25, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
70. The plaintiffs had also pled causes of action for breach of contract, invasion of privacy
and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, which is broader than the common law claim
and is not subject to the relatively strict requirements of California law. For example, all that
need be alleged is that the misleading representation "is likely to cause confusion, or to deceive
purchasers into believing the source of origin of the goods is another." National Lampoon,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 733, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) aff'd 497
F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974).
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proceedings."'" Orion appealed the reversal as error;72 the Lutzes ap-
pealed the dismissal of the other complaints.73 On September 26, 1989
the California Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal.
III. REASONING OF THE LUTZ COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Elements of Pleading Required to Establish Unfair Competition
The Lutz court affirmed the Tomlin holding that an action for unfair
competition must be based upon a theory of public deception or confu-
sion.74 According to Tomlin, "[s]ince Sears and Compco, the appropria-
tion [of a property right] theory of state protection for literary titles
retains no vitality.",75 The court stated that since titles are no longer
considered property, anyone may use a title "if not used in such manner
as to induce the public to believe that the work to which it is applied is
the identical thing which it originally designated."'76 Justice Compton
wrote the unanimous opinion in Tomlin and the majority opinion in
Lutz. 77
In Tomlin, song composer, Pinky Tomlin, sued Walt Disney Pro-
ductions claiming that its 1969 movie, The Love Bug, unfairly used the
title of his popular 1937 song, "The Love Bug Will Bite You (If You
Don't Watch Out)."' 78 In 1937 Tomlin had assigned his rights in the
composition to the publisher in return for royalties. 79 The court recog-
nized that, although the legend of the love "bug" was "part of the Ameri-
can idiom long prior to 1937," Tomlin's composition enjoyed greater
popularity than other similarly titled compositions.8 ° However, the
court held that Tomlin's claim for misappropriation, "wrongful taking of
plaintiff's property" and "unauthorized use by [Disney] of [Tomlin's]
71. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (citing Dino, Inc. v. Boreta
Enterprises, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 2d 336, 339, 38 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1964)).
72. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 21-22, Lutz (No. B 029 439)
(Aug. 8, 1989).
73. The Lutz court granted plaintiffs' costs on the appeal. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1325,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
74. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (citing Tomlin v. Walt Disney
Prod., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (1971)).
75. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 234, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
76. Id. at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (quoting Curtis v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 140
Cal. App. 2d 461, 469, 295 P.2d 62, 67 (1956)).
77. Justice Roth concurred in Tomlin and dissented in Lutz.
78. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 229-30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
79. Id. at 229, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
80. Id.
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property," 8' was barred by Sears and Compco. 82
The Tomlin court held that, in an unfair competition action for
copying a title which has achieved secondary meaning, the plaintiff must
plead special damages that are the result of "(1) a failure of the defendant
to take reasonable precautions to prevent public confusion, (2) with the
intent to deceive the public as to the source of the literary work."83
The Lutz court modified these requirements. It held that the Lutzes
had properly pled a cause of action for unfair competition by alleging (1)
that they had created a secondary meaning in the word "Amityville;" (2)
that the public was misled into believing that the film was the anticipated
sequel to the first movie; and (3) that Orion had intentionally traded off
and appropriated for themselves the valuable secondary meaning created
by the plaintiffs' efforts and expense. 84 Because Lutz held that a title is
never protectable unless it "has acquired a secondary meaning,"85 rules
of title protection are further distinguished from rules of trademark law,
which require secondary meaning for only one category of trademark.86
2. Public Involvement
The Lutz court's subtle modification of Tomlin is important. It
points out the public involvement in an action for unfair competition.
The public (1) creates secondary meaning by identifying the title with a
81. Id. at 235-36, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
82. Id. at 236, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
83. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123. Later in the opinion, Tomlin
stated that relief turned on a
showing that (1) "The Love Bug" had acquired a "secondary meaning" and that (2)
there was a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public between his song and
Disney's picture, (3) as a result of Disney's wrongful and intentional failure to take
precautions to prevent that confusion.
Id. at 236, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
84. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109. Orion, it was alleged, had
deceptively titled and advertised their movie to mislead the public into believing the film was
the anticipated sequel to the first movie which would be based upon the Lutzes' best-seller,
"The Amityville Horror II." Id.
85. Id. at 1322, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (citing Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 2d at 230, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 120).
86. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 991-92 (7th Cir.
1989).
[A] term for which trademark protection is claimed generally fits somewhere in the
spectrum of classifications ranging from (1) generic or common descriptive and (2)
merely descriptive to (3) suggestive and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. A generic or com-
mon descriptive term ... cannot become a trademark .... A merely descriptive
term . . .can, by acquiring a second meaning .... become a valid trademark. A
suggestive term .. .can be protected without proof of a secondary meaning, [e.g.,
"Tide," "Coppertone"]. An arbitrary or fanciful term enjoys the same full protection
as a suggestive term.
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particular work or author; (2) is misled by confusing use of the title; and
(3) unjustly enriches the manipulative user.a7 Because Tomlin held that
a plaintiff must "plead a failure of the defendant to take reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent public confusion," Orion claimed that it could avoid
liability, as a matter of law, by simply using a disclaimer.8 8 The Lutz
court did not consider Orion's alleged disclaimers. 9 The opinion quoted
part of Orion's advertising for Amityville II The Possession: "The Night
of February 5, 1976, George and Kathleen Lutz and their three children
fled their home in Amityville, New York. They got out alive! Their liv-
ing nightmare shocked audiences around the world in The Amityville
Horror. "90 The opinion ignored the text of Orion's alleged disclaimer
immediately following: "But before them, another family lived in this
house and were caught by the original evil. They weren't so lucky...
this is their story!"9'
The defendants claimed that the statement fulfilled the requirements
of Tomlin and that it was enough to avoid suit.92 But, the Lutz court
held that an allegation of public confusion is sufficient to proceed to trial
on the issue.93 Therefore, the court recognized the public's interest in an
honest marketplace by returning the focus of the inquiry to a full factual
determination of public confusion rather than Tomlin's apparent focus
on the single issue of the reasonableness of the defendants' alleged dis-
claimers as a bar to suit.
Orion's use of a disclaimer is only probative of its good faith in
adopting the title. In determining public confusion, the second element
of unfair competition, many more factors are weighed. Trademark law
has categorized many of these factors in its analogous "multifactor bal-
87. Cf. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
88. See Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 21-22 Lutz (No. B 029
439) (Aug. 8, 1989). This inference comes from the discussion in Tomlin which had found
that:
Inherent in the language in Gordon is the conclusion that a defendant copier can
avoid liability by taking reasonable precautions to avoid public confusion by identify-
ing the source of its work or disclaiming any connection with plaintiff's work.
Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 235, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (citing Gordon v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 31, 74 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1969)).
89. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 21, Lutz (No. B 029 439)
(Aug. 8, 1989).
90. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
91. Petition for Review of Decision of the Court of Appeal at 21, Lutz (No. B 029 439)
(Aug. 8, 1989).
92. Id. at 21-22.
93. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
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ancing test" used to determine the likelihood of public confusion.94 This
test examines the "totality of the circumstances" including the following
factors: (1) the strength or weakness of the mark; (2) the degree of simi-
larity between the two marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the
likelihood that the prior user will enter the same market; (5) actual pub-
lic confusion; and the reciprocal of (1) the defendants' good faith in
adopting the similar mark; (2) the quality of the defendants' product; and
(3) the sophistication of the buyer.95 Therefore, the Lutz court's modifi-
cation of the elements of the pleading establishes that a full factual in-
quiry into public confusion is necessary despite the use of alleged
disclaimers.
3. Secondary Meaning Is Always a Question of Fact
The Tomlin court examined Tomlin's claim of secondary meaning
to see if relief might be granted for unfair competition within the restric-
tions of Sears and Compco. 96 A title acquires secondary meaning when a
substantial segment of the purchasing public associates the title with a
particular person, work or source, even if anonymous.97 But, the Tomlin
court found that "[e]ven the most liberal interpretation of Tomlin's pres-
entation at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment fails to
establish a triable issue of fact."9 In Lutz the court found that Orion
missed the point when arguing that no secondary meaning could attach,
as a matter of law, to the word "Amityville" because of the license held
by Orion and "Amityville's" subsequent association with several
works.9 9 The Lutz court held that determining the status of the required
94. Hasbro v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961)).
95. Id.
96. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 236, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
97. See B. WITKIN, 4 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 51 Titles (9th ed. 1987).
The court examined and rejected defendant's theory that the title had not acquired a
secondary meaning because the play was unsuccessful: (1) The 'public' does not
mean all the people, and the title of a play produced in New York may acquire a
secondary meaning throughout the United States. (2) The work need not be popular;
it is enough that notoriety and adverse comment may bring about a widespread iden-
tification of the play by its title. (3) A long period of use is unnecessary; the test is
not of time but of impact on the public mind. (4) It need not be shown that the title
is associated with the author; it is usual and sufficient to show identification with the
literary work. (5) The fact that the plaintiff did not produce his play during a 2-year
period after its New York closing did not show abandonment of the title as a matter
of law.
Id. (citing Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 121, 222 P.2d 433
(1950)).
98. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
99. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
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secondary meaning is always a matter of fact and "cannot be determined
at the demurrer stage of the proceedings."'100
The dispositive question was whether the Lutzes had pleaded suffi-
cient operative facts to establish a cause of action.' 0 1 The court stated
that "the allegations in the complaint are to be regarded as true and are
to be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice be-
tween the parties."' °2 The Lutz court found that: "Reduced to funda-
mentals, secondary meaning is a shorthand phrase which describes the
existence of conditions from which public confusion will flow if the de-
fendant is permitted to pursue his deceptive scheme."'0 3  Multiple
sources and use of the name of an actual city named Amityville are
"merely factors [among others] to consider in making the factual evalua-
tion of whether or not plaintiffs ever acquired a protectable secondary
meaning."l°'
B. The Dissenting Opinion
1. The Misconception That Tomlin Allows Transfers In Gross of
Property Rights in Titles
The Tomlin court held that Tomlin was not the real party in interest
because he had sold his title rights along with the copyright of his
song.'0 5 The court found that Tomlin's "'song, including the title, be-
came the property of the publisher. An accretion in the value of the
property, including the acquisition of a secondary meaning for the title,
necessarily belonged to the owner, to wit, the publisher.' 0 6 The Lutz
dissent relied on Tomlin in saying that title "protection ... is an excep-
tion to the policy of a free and competitive economy. That protection
should not be loosely expanded, particularly when the defendant's prod-
ucts are literary works, for in such an instance the policy favoring free-
dom of artistic expression is also implicated."'0 7 The dissent continued:
It is astonishing that the Lutzes should sell exclusive and per-
petual motion picture and television rights to the first book, in-
cluding the title "The Amityville Horror, " to a picture company,
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1323-24, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
102. Id. (citing Rader Co. v. Stone, 178 Cal. App. 3d 10, 20, 223 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1986);
Barney v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 966, 973-74, 230 Cal. Rptr. 215
(1986)).
103. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
104. Id., 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (emphasis in the original).
105. Tomlin, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 238-39, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
106. Id.
107. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1325, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Roth, P.J., dissenting).
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then claim that any proprietary rights in a resulting secondary
meaning of that title still belong to them exclusively.'o
The dissent contended that the transfer of rights was unlimited (in gross)
and therefore the Lutzes could not have any expectation of secondary
meaning."°9 The Lutzes had "no significant participation in the making
of the first movie" and thus, could not claim credit, as a matter of law,
for capturing the "public's attention and imagination.""'  According to
the dissent, the rule of Tomlin should be that any "motion picture" prop-
erty rights in the title belong to the owner of the motion picture rights to
the copyright of the work.I' The dissent's argument suggests that, once
a title is licensed, in any form, the author no longer has any rights in the
title because of the multiple sources." 2 Therefore, Orion would be free
to use the title for unrelated motion pictures.
The dissent missed important differences between Tomlin and Lutz.
While Tomlin's sole source of secondary meaning was the song, the
Lutzes wrote two best sellers in addition to licensing the original hit mo-
tion picture. In Tomlin, the defendant was a stranger to the assignment
of the title. Therefore, the assignee was the proper party to protect the
secondary meaning of the title against uses which competed unfairly with
the song. In Lutz, Orion, as successor-in-interest to the assignee, seized
rights to the title unrelated to its assignment in the copyright of the un-
derlying work. Orion used the title for an unauthorized and unrelated
motion picture. Therefore, Orion acted as a stranger to the original un-
derlying work because its use of the work's title was unrelated to ex-
ploitation of the work's copyright. If plaintiffs, like the Lutzes, are
refused standing as the dissent urges, the public would be denied all pro-
tection from confusion.
108. Id. at 1326, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Roth, P.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
l10. Id.
11. Cf. Id. at 1328, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (Roth, P.J., dissenting) ("The Lutzes and Anson
sold PFI all motion picture rights in the first book and in its copyright, with the sole exception
of the reserved right to make a sequel depicting the Lutzes in subsequent events."). But see
Trust Co. Bank v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 772 F.2d 740 at 746 (1985) (citing the dis-
trict court's reliance upon Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 216
F.2d 945 (1954) (the Sam Spade decision) (A producer can "not necessarily rely on an implicit
grant of sequel rights in an agreement conveying motion picture rights.")).
112. Cf Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1328, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (Roth, P.J., dissenting)
("Having licensed The Amityville Horror to PFI, they (and Jones, Kimatian, and Gotham
Press, who came later) simply cannot show the requisite exclusivity of their interest in the title
'The Amityville Horror.' ").
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2. The Better Rule
The Lutz majority rejected the dissent's argument by stating that
multiple sources are merely evidence to be considered by the trier of fact
in deciding whether secondary meaning has been established. "3 The bet-
ter rule implied by the Lutz majority is that secondary meaning vests in
the assignee of a title for the purpose of protecting that assignment in
uses appurtenant to the transferred copyright." 4 In Allied Artists Pic-
tures Corporation v. Friedman, ("Allied Artists")" 5 the only other title
case since Tomlin, the California Court of Appeal protected the assignee
by finding that the trial court had the power to enforce an injunction
with extraterritorial impact. 16 The Allied Artists court recognized that
the American distributor of the erotic motion picture,, " The Story of 0,
had a proper cause-of-action to protect its license against unfair competi-
tion by the distributor of the low budget, sexual exploitation movie,"1
8
The Journey of 0. "1
According to the definition of secondary meaning crafted by the
Lutz court, thepublic itself vests rights in titles regardless of the language
in transfer agreements.' 2 The only title right recognized in California is
the right to sue for unfair competition. 2 ' If the plaintiff establishes the
elements of unfair competition (i.e., (1) secondary meaning; (2) public
confusion; and (3) the defendants' intent to deceive the public), the title
rights cannot vest with the defendant no matter what language of trans-
fer appears in a contract between the parties.
122
113. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
114. Cf American Broadcasting v. Wahl, 36 F. Supp. 167, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ("Defend-
ants contend that there can be no license of a trade-mark or even an assignment there-of except
in connection with the transfer of the business with which it has already been used. The point
is well taken."); Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879) ("As distinct property, separate
from the article created by the original producer or manufacturer, it [a trademark] may not be
the subject of sale.").
115. 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977).
116. Id. at 136-37, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100.
117. Id. at 131, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 135, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (It is unimportant that the secondary meaning resulted
from the activities of persons other than Allied. . . . The critical question is whether the
secondary meaning had been established in the public mind and not the precise manner in
which it was created.").
120. Lutz 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 108 ("Reduced to fundamentals,
secondary meaning is a shorthand phrase which describes the existence of conditions from
which public confusion will flow if the defendant is permitted to pursue his deceptive
scheme.").
121. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
122. The question of an author's ability to expressly waive the future right to sue is not
addressed in Lutz See also supra note 111.
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IV. COMMENTARY
Yet, there is no part of the law which is more plastic than un-
fair competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable
wrong 25 years ago may have become such today.
-Judge Learned Hand 
123
A. Mixing Title Rights and Moral Rights of Authors:
Beyond The Valley of the Dolls
Authors can retain important rights that may not be transferred be-
cause the public sometimes identifies, as they are often encouraged to do,
a literary work's title with its author. In Sujac Productions v. Twentieth-
Century Fox, ("Sujac")124 author Jacqueline Susann successfully sued
Twentieth-Century Fox ("Fox") for unfair competition because Fox had
named an X-rated, exploitation movie Beyond The Valley of The
Dolls. 12' The public thought that she had written it, Susann claimed,
because she had written the popular story, "The Valley of the Dolls"
which was the basis of a hit motion picture produced by Fox.' 26
Fox was licensed to use the title of Jacqueline Susann's book, "The
Valley of the Dolls," for this motion picture. 127 When Fox produced and
123. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other
grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
124. Sujac Prods. v. Twentieth-Century Fox, Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles (1975) (No. C 975 612).
125. Verdict, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (Aug. 1, 1975) entered in Book of Judgments at 162
(No. 7047) (Aug. 4, 1975).
126. Complaint at 6, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (April 24, 1970).
127. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Entry
Notwithstanding the Verdict at 3-5, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (1975). Twentieth-Century Fox
argued that Jacqueline Susann had transferred her rights in gross to the title "Valley of the
Dolls" by the following clause, which Twentieth-Century Fox had used in all its contracts
since 1941:
3. Owner hereby grants and assigns to Purchaser, its successors, licensees and as-
signs (hereinafter called Purchaser) forever, throughout the world, the following
rights in and to the Literary Property:
(c) The sole and exclusive rights to make, produce, adapt, sell, lease, rent, exhibit
and, subject to paragraph 23 hereof with respect to television series rights in the
Literary Property, to televise any motion picture versions of the Literary Property by
any manner and means now known or hereafter developed, and to perform and gen-
erally deal in and with and to copyright and in any manner license, exploit and dis-
pose of motion picture versions of said Literary Property, or any part or portion
thereof, and of the characters and characterizations therein, in any and all languages,
with or without sound accompaniment and with or without the interpolation of mu-
sical numbers therein, and for such purposes to adapt one or more versions of said
Literary Property, to add to and subtract from the Literary Property with any other
literary works, change the sequence thereof, change the title of said Literary Prop-
erty, use said title, or any of its components, in connection with works or motion pic-
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distributed an unrelated, unauthorized sequel motion picture entitled Be-
yond The Valley of The Dolls, Jacqueline Susann sued; like the Lutzes,
she claimed that the producers were not licensed to use her title in this
manner. 2 Fox claimed that they had bought unlimited rights to the
sequel title as well as to the original title.'2 9 Susann claimed that such a
transfer in gross would be against public policy.'
30
Susann claimed that Fox's lurid sequel, Beyond The Valley of The
Dolls, would unfairly compete with her "present and future business in-
terests and earning ability" '3' because she had established secondary
meaning in the title of her book, "The Valley of the Dolls," and in Fox's
subsequent motion picture version.1 32 Susann claimed that because of
the similar title there would be a public association of her with the ex-
ploitation, X-rated picture, Beyond The Valley of The Dolls, and that
would "cause great and irreparable injury and damage to... her stature
as an author."'
133
As evidence of the public's confusion, Susann submitted articles
which appeared in Newsweek, Playboy and the Daily News which re-
ferred to Beyond The Valley of The Dolls as Susann's sequel. 134 Fox, like
tures wholly or partially independent of said Literary Property, change the characters
in said Literary Property, change the description of said characters, and to use any
and all thereof in new versions, remakes, adaptations and sequels in any and all lan-
guages and to register and obtain copyright therein.
Id. (emphasis added).
128. [Plaintiff's] Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 11-12, Sujac (No. C 975 612)
(May 22, 1970).
129. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Defendant's Motion for Entry
of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict at 3, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (Aug. 28, 1975). "Fox
had obtained by contract from Sujac the absolute right to use the title 'Beyond . . . ' on any
work or motion picture including a work or motion picture which was wholly independent of
the book 'Dolls' or wholly independent of the screen treatment for a sequel to 'Dolls' written
by Su[z]ann[e]." Id.
130. [Plaintiff's] Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 11-12, Sujac (No. C 975 612)
(May 22, 1970).
131. Complaint at 15, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (April 24, 1970).
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 6. This position paralleled the modem trend in trademark cases which recog-
nizes the expanded functions of trademarks:
Putting aside prescribed categories for a moment, we agree with the reasoning of
Judge Bright's dissent in the Eight Circuit Anheuser-Busch case. As Judge Bright
points out, the objectives of trademark law are twofold: (1) to prevent confusion
among consumers as to the source of goods or services; and (2) to indicate ownership
and permit the trademark owner to control the product's reputation.
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 997 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing
Anheuser-Busch v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 644 (Bright, J., dissenting) (8th Cir.
1984)).
134. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of Defendant's Motion for New
Trial at 23, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (Aug. 28, 1975).
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Orion, claimed that it had distinguished its film sufficiently to avoid a
suit because it had placed disclaimers, as prescribed by Tomlin, indicat-
ing that Susann was not the author on its display advertising, its posters
and on the motion picture itself1 a5 Susann had not, like the Lutzes, al-
ready written and published a best-seller sequel book. She had, unlike
the Lutzes, sold the right to use the "Beyond" title.1 36 Yet, the jury
found for the plaintiff and awarded her damages in the sum of
$2,000,000.137 When Fox's motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for a new trial were denied, the parties settled for
$1,425,000. 138
B. Title Rights, Moral Rights and the Berne Convention
In the future, title protection involving authors may be further dif-
ferentiated from trademark law, which is not concerned with author's
rights, because the United States recently acceded to the "Berne Conven-
tion for the International Protection of Literary Works" ("Berne Conven-
tion "). Article 6bis (1) states a principal of moral rights which cannot be
transferred:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in re-
lation to, the said work, which shall be prejudicial to his honor
or reputation. '39
The United States Senate determined that existing provisions of Ameri-
can law were in conformity with the requirements of the Berne Conven-
tion to protect authors' rights under Article 6bis. 140 Jacqueline Susann's
complaint focused on injury to her reputation caused by Fox's manipula-
tive use of the title to her best seller which she had sold them. Therefore,
135. Id. at 24. As did Orion, Fox contended that its disclaimers and precautions were
reasonable as a matter of law because the Tomlin court had said "a defendant copier can avoid
liability by taking reasonable precautions to avoid public confusion by identifying the source of
its work or disclaiming any connection with Plaintiff's work." Id. at 11-12.
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
137. Jury Verdict, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (Aug. 1, 1975) entered in Book of Judgments at
162 (No. 7047) (Aug. 4, 1975).
138. Satisfaction of Judgment, Sujac (No. C 975 612) (Sept. 18, 1975).
139. D. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 33 (1989).
140. D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.12[A] (1989). See also U.S. ADHERENCE
TO THE BERNE CONVENTION: HEARINGS ON THE IMPLICATIONS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL, OF U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, S. Rep. No. J-25, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1985-86).
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her successful suit against Fox indicates that the Senate was correct, be-
cause her moral rights as defined under the Berne Convention were pro-
tected. It is unclear what the future of moral rights in America may
be.' 4 ' Future cases of unfair competition may, like Sujac and Lutz, take
the author's moral rights into consideration when determining the exist-
ence of secondary meaning in a title or special damages. 42
V. CONCLUSION
A. Reliance upon the Public Interest Creates a Trilemma
The Lutz court faced a trilemma because it had to draft rules to
reconcile the interests of two opposing private parties while best preserv-
ing the public's interest. 4 3 On one horn of this trilemma is the Lutzes'
claim that they are the party in whom the secondary meaning reposes.
They claim reliance upon their popularity and the public's desire to view
movies about their continuing story.
On the second horn of the trilemma, Orion claims reliance on a typi-
cal industry contract in which the Lutzes transferred their rights. Such
industry transfer agreements use very broad terms, such as "unlimited"
or "independent" to grant the freedom to make adaptations and changes
necessary to bring the literary property to the screen free from claims of
distortion or mutilation on the part of the author.'"
The third horn of the trilemma is the public's expectation of an hon-
141. See, e.g., Sobel, US. Enters New Era in International Copyright Relations. Joins Berne;
Seeks GA TT International Property Code, Settles MPEAA's Trade Complaint vs. South Korea,
10 ENT. LAW REP. at 3-9 (Nov. 1988). Almost a third of the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 1988 ("BCIA") is designed to forestall any claim that the Berne Convention is self-
executing under U.S. law. D. NiMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.12[A] at 1-101 (1989).
However, there is U.S. Supreme Court precedent for finding a treaty to be self-executing.
Id. at 1-103 n.24 (citing U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833)).
142. The Lutz court found that Amityville 3-D was totally fictitious and that Amityville 11
The Possession depicted events in a fictionalized manner. Lutz, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 1321-22,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08. The court also found that the Lutzes propound that "The Amityville
Horror" and "The Amityville Horror II" depict real events. Id. at 1320, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
The Lutzes might claim special damages because of a loss of credibility (reputation) brought
about by Orion's use of the Amityville titles. Since the public now associates the Lutzes with
Orion's fictional works, the public might be more skeptical of the Lutzes' stories depicting the
psychic phenomena which they have experienced.
143. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.2, at 33 (3d ed. 1986) ("The pattern
by which property rights emerge and grow in a society is related to increases in the ratio of the
benefits of property rights to their costs.").
144. Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding the Interpretation of Paragraph 3(c) of the
1965 and 1968 Agreements at 12-15, Lutz (No. B 029 439) (May 22, 1970) (citing Goodis v.
United Artists Television, 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970)).
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est and vibrant marketplace.' 45 Public policy requires a prolific en-
tertainment industry and therefore usually does not discourage copying
of titles and ideas. But public policy also protects each individual con-
sumer's right to choose among the many entertainment alternatives and
to know what it is he or she is choosing. In the context of resolving this
trilemma, involving the very nature of property rights in literary titles,
Lutz has been decided.
B. Does the Owner of a Copyrighted Work Own Its Title?
Does the confusion, agitation and exasperation of this examination
of Lutz help a lawyer answer the client's simple question? Yes. Califor-
nia has a clear rule for titles.
Titles are not property in any ordinary sense analogous to copy-
rights or patents. The expectations of buyers and sellers, according to
Lutz, are subordinated to the public's expectations because rights in titles
are only recognized in the context of an action for unfair competition.
Therefore, the rule for protecting proprietary rights in titles is simple:
Even in a free market, stealing a title by defrauding the public, whose
expectations are paramount, is not allowed.
Vincent Yanniello *
145. "[No one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another." Prouty v. National
Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939) (quoting Vogue Co. v. Thompson-
Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924)).
* My wife, Danita, deserves my appreciation for her patience and support as do my
children, Ian-Vincent and Maggie-Rose, for preserving my sense of humor. Thanks to James
Tierney for caring, and, for her encouragement and astute editing, Cherise Wolas.
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